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The agricultural economy  is  currently experiencing structural  adjustment
due to  complex forces  affecting commodities prices,  farm costs,  agricultural
technology  and asset values.  These  forces  interact  in many ways,  presenting a
confusing picture:  although large numbers of  farms  are  in  or near  bankruptcy,
creating a general perception of  farm crisis, many remain profitable.  This has
led  some observers  to conclude  that  the failing farms must  be  too  small  and
technologically inefficient, and  that market  forces  are culling  the  tech-
nologically weak from the herd.  This  view, which suggests that  technological
"economies of  large size" dominate  farming,  is  widely held.  Yet  it  is  countered
by  the observation  that many of  the  farms most deeply in  trouble are  in  fact
quite large and technologically advanced.
This  paper will argue  that size and  technological  efficiency are  far  less
important than whether a given farm (of whatever size)  is heavily  indebted.
Government policies exacerbating this debt  position or imposing  additional
stress may in  turn play as  large a role as market  forces  in  the  future  structure
of  American agriculture.  The paper highlights  the difference between tech-
nological forces, which may drive farmers  from the  sector due  to  their inability
to  keep pace with physical or engineering innovations;  and  financial  forces,
which operate through the prices  of  goods and  assets  in  the market  (see
Yotopoulos and Nugent,  1976,  Chapter 5).  Technological efficiencies  result  from
the optimal combination of  engineering  inputs  (fertilizer, water,  etc.),  while
financial efficiencies  result  from  the optimal combination of  financial
resources  (such as  collateral  and  credit)  in  the purchase  of  goods  and  assets.
While both sorts  of efficiency are  important  to  farm survival,  it  is  useful to
separate them for  purposes of  policy analysis.-2-
Both theoretical and  empirical evidence  fail  to  support  the  contention  that
technological efficiencies  per se  have  led  to  larger  farms.  This  evidence
suggests  that  increasing farm size  is  primarily  the  result  of  changing  finan-
cial conditions, notably  the relative cost  of  capital  and  labor, and  the
"pecuniary"  advantages  enjoyed by  larger  farms.  Despite  these  advantages,
declining land  prices  caught up with heavily indebted  farmers  in  the  1980s,  many
of  whom were quite large.  This  is  reflected by  the changing debt/asset  posi-
tion, or "leverage,"  of  individual  farm producers.  As  farm assets  rose  in value
throughout the  1970s,  increased acreage  and  increased borrowing were attractive,
especially because inflation kept  real  interest levels  low.  Large  farm debts
were acquired,  based on forecasts of  continued  increases in  land  values.  These
forecasts were wrong.  Beginning  in 1980-81,  major devaluations  in  farm assets
together with increases in real  interest costs created extreme  financial
pressures for farmers  that  acquired large levels  of debt  to  purchase  these
assets.  Many  of  these  farmers were  young, well-educated,  and  technologically
advanced.  Hence, financial  factors,  generally the  result  of  forecasting errors
in which asset devaluations were  not  forseen, dominate  technological  factors  as
a cause  of  structural change  in agriculture.l/
This  result,  if correct,  has  important  policy  implications  for  three
reasons.  First,  it  suggests  that  some technologically advanced  farm producers,
both large and small, may be driven from  the sector  due  to  changes  in  financial
conditions arising  largely from outside of  agriculture  or agricultural policy.
One  consequence appears  to  be  to  stabilize farm size.  Second,  the  level  of
1/  This argument does not  suggest  that  other  causes may not also be  important,
such  as  the life-cycle  of  individual  farmers.  The focus  here  is restricted
to  these major causes  due  to  their popularity as  explanations.-3-
financial  stress  in agriculture  will  be highly skewed  toward younger  farmers,
many  of whom are more well-educated and more  rapid adopters of  new technology
than older producers.  Their quits will therefore  represent higher  social costs
in terms  of foregone returns  to investments  in agricultural  research and educa-
tion.  Third,  if  current trends  continue,  the  remaining  producers may be  less
indebted but also less technologically efficient  than those  that  quit.  This
could lead to declines in  the global competitiveness  of American  farmers.
This paper  is organized as  follows.  First, a discussion of  farm size  and
the  role of  technical change in agriculture  is  presented,  together with an
analysis  of financial  stress  arising especially from falling  land  values.
Second, a specific empirical example  is  developed illustrating  the  significance
of  financial stress  on even technologically efficient  producers.  Third,  the
implications of  these results  for  policy are explored.  The  fourth section  is  a
conclusion.-4-
FARM SIZE AND TECHNICAL CHANGE  IN  AGRICULTURE
Farm size in the United States  has grown substantially  over the  past  half-
century.  From 1930  to  1980,  land  area per  farm increased over  2.5  times,  while
the number of  farms  decreased from  6.3  to  2.7  million.  Despite continued warn-
nings  of  corporate  takeovers of  agriculture, American farms  are  likely  to  remain
almost  entirely  family units,  even  if  incorporated for  tax  reasons.  As  of  1979,
only 2.4  percent of  all  farm and  ranchland in  the United  States was  cultivated
by nonfamily corporate  farms  (U.S.D.A.,  1979).  Increases  in farm size have
occurred  primarily as a result of  expansion  purchases  by  some  farmers  of  other
retiring or quitting  farmers' acreage  (see Emerson and Raup,  1985).
Despite  rhetorical warnings of  impending "superfarms,"  the historical
record suggests that  the death of  the  family farm as an institution  is  exag-
gerated.  Studies of  the late  19th Century Bonanza Farms  of  the  Red  River
Valley, in which 20,000 to  55,000 acres were cultivated using hired  labor  forces
and equipment, indicated major inefficiencies  (Briggs,  1932).  These  farms
ceased  to operate and were broken into family-sized  units  and sold  in  the early
1900's.
In  an analysis of  the  sources of  changing  farm size, Kislev and Peterson
(1982)  developed an equilibrium theory of  the size  of  the  family farm which
showed that  out-migration (or quits)  of  farm labor and  the growth of  farm size
are  two  aspects of  the  same economic process.  Increasing urban incomes  serve  as
an  incentive to  leave  farming;  the remaining land  is  left  to  fewer but  larger
farms.  Their analysis  concentrated on three  factors:  input  prices, nonfarm
income, and  technology,  although  it  specifically excluded expectations  of  future
land values and inflation as  factors determining farm  size.-5-
The dominance of  the  family unit in  agriculture  and of  the
large corporation  in  the nonfarm sector  testifies  to  the
lack of  significant economies  of  scale in most  farming
operations and  their existence in other industries.  Owners
of  large amounts of wealth  therefore invested  their capital
in  the nonfarm sector.  Where  large farm enterprises  ran
into scale diseconomies  they were  subdivided into  family
units.  The American family farm was  preserved  by ample non-
farm investment opportunities  (Kislev and Peterson,  p. 587).
Current  rates of  return in agriculture compared  to  the  nonfarm sector  suggest
that  the  family  farm continues to  be  unattractive  to corporate  raiders.
The  primary factor responsible  for  the growth in  farm size has  not  been
off-farm corporate acquisition, but  the  change in  the relative  opportunity  cost
of  farm labor in relation  to  that  of  farm machinery  (see Kislev and Peterson, p.
588,  Table 3).  From 1930-70,  the  ratio of wage  to machine costs  increased  2.8
percent per year.  The increasing opportunity costs  of  farm labor, reflected by
the relatively higher real wages  available in  the non-farm sector, induced
substantial substitution of mechanical  power, leading  to  increases in  the  ratio
of machine  to  labor  inputs  by 4.8  percent over the  period  (Kislev and Peterson,
p. 590).  The same  forces which attracted labor out of  agriculture also  freed
land resources  and prompted substitution of  larger mechanically-driven  tech-
nology for labor.  The  farm family, able  to cultivate  larger acreage,  purchased
or rented the  land left behind, and  farm size grew.  The  process  of  tech-
nological change from 1930-70  thus  involved  the application of  new engineering
principles  to  land  freed by off-farm migration.  What made increases  in  farm
size  possible was  the changing  relative price  of mechanical  inputs  (with biolo-
gical  inputs enhancing production per acre,  but not  farm  size per  se).
Between 1970 and  1976,  however, the  opportunity cost of  farm labor relative
to machine costs  was  reversed.  The  reversal,  which has persisted, means  that-6-
the ratio of wages in relation to machinery costs  has  fallen.  This  has  created
incentives for  fewer and  smaller farm machines.  (The recent  bankruptcy of  the
Steiger Tractor Company provides some evidence  for  this  switch).  If  the  find-
ings  reported by Kislev and  Peterson continue to hold,  then farm size  should
stabilize and perhaps even decline  (1982,  p. 592).
In  fact,  farm size did  not grow appreciably  in  the  1970s  and early  1980s,
supporting Kislev and Petersons'  hypothesis.  Although the national average grew
from 352  acres  in  1969  to 440  acres  in  1982,  this  average was  accompanied by  a
declining rate  of increase,  from 2.1  percent from 1964-69  to -.5  percent  from
1978-82.  The general  trend is  also  obscured by  averages,  since smaller  hobby
farms  have  increased  in number  as  have very  large farms,  with  the  central  ten-
dency moving  upward but  at  a steadily decelerating rate.
And the principal advantages of  the very large  farms may not be  tech-
nological, but  financial.  In a recent  report  evaluating the  impact of  tech-
nology on farm structure, the Office  of Technology Assessment  noted  that  some  of
the  principal advantages of very large  farms  are  not  technological, but  are  in
buying and  selling in large  quantities and  in access  to  credit.  "There is  some
evidence,"  the  report noted,  "that  inclusion of  such pecuniary economies would
lower the average production costs  for  large  farm units  and would  shift the
conclusion about the size  of  the most  competitive farm" (OTA, 1985,  pp.  27-28).
Additional support  for  the importance of  financial advantages accruing  to  large
farms  is  provided for North Dakota small-grain production by  Dalsted (1972)  and
for  Texas  cotton production and marketing by  Smith, et  al.  (1984).  These advan-
tages  do not  derive  from superior physical or engineering  factors, but  from a
different  set of  prices  faced and  financial  resources available  to  very large
farms.-7-
If  the explanation  for  farm size  is  not  technological economies  per  se,
then financial  factors  as well  as  expectations of  future  land  values  and infla-
tion take on added  importance.  All  loomed  large in  the decision of  some  farmers
to expand  in the  1970s.  Unfortunately, what may have  seemed  rational  in  1975
proved  disasterous in  1985.  The University of  Minnesota has  compiled  land
market data which provides  a useful basis  for evaluating  the  unusual  changes  in
the value of  farm land  assets during  the  1970s  and  1980s  (see Figure  1).  A time
series  of  this data, expressed in  both nominal and real  terms  (deflated by  the
Consumer Price  Index),  shows  that  the  1970's  and  early 1980's  saw an  histori-
cally unprecedented departure  of  real and  nominal land values,  and  equally
unprecedented increases and  decreases in  both.  Throughout the  period,  most
farmland purchase continued  to be by expanding farmers,  with the majority  of
sales  to  those within the same  county and often  the  same  township (Emerson and
Raup, 1985).  Indeed,  the  proportion of  expansion buyers increased  in Minnesota
from approximately 55  percent  in  1970  to 79  percent  in  1984.  In  nominal  terms,
Minnesota farmland  increased  over fourfold  in value between  1972  and  1981  before
beginning on equally  steep decline, ultimately resulting in  a 26  percent  drop
from 1985  to  1986.  This increase and  decline was  repeated  in varying degrees
throughout the farmbelt,  and has  had  disastrous effects on  the debt/asset  posi-
tion of  those who used  land in  the  1970s  as  collateral to  acquire substantial
additional debt.
In  retrospect,  the decision  to  base  farm expansion on continued appre-
ciation  in land values was extremely unwise.  Yet during the  1970s  high  levels
of  inflation, expanding export markets and  low real  interest  rates made  farm
expansion, including  land purchases,  a seemingly rational strategy.  Increases
in  farmland prices  made entry  into agriculture,  in  turn, increasingly expensive-8-
for  beginning farmers who did not  inherit a full complement of  land  and equip-
ment.  Many borrowed heavily  to gain entry  to  the sector, which promised  to
reward the  investment through asset  appreciation if  not  profits.
Farmers were not alone in  their bullish views  of  land  assets.  Farm lenders
and some agricultural economists  promoted expansion.  Major investments were
made in  services and infrastructure by private investors,  including  the major
grain companies, in  the expectation that an export-driven expansion in  the  farm
economy would continue.  In addition, until  1979 most of  the deposit  instruments
and rates charged borrowers at  rural lending institutions were  regulated,
leading to borrowing which when combined with inflation sometimes made  the  real
cost  of  funds negative.
In  1980-81  the bubble burst.  A strengthening dollar,  the  1979-80 grain
embargo, and  rapid increases in acreage  planted  to grain crops in Europe and
Latin America led  to  steady erosion in export markets which has  continued.
Deregulation of  rural credit markets  led  to  rapid  increases  in nominal  interest
rates.  Substantially lowered levels  of  inflation pushed the  real costs  of
borrowed  funds  from negative levels  in  1979  to historic highs by  1985.
Increased real  interest rates,  supported by  the huge federal borrowing  needs
required to  finance  $200 billion dollar deficits, attracted foreign investors  to
U.S. Treasury securities.  In  order  to purchase  these instruments  these
investors required dollars,  helping  to reinforce the  strength of  the  currency,
which continued to  float in  late  1985 at  levels substantially above  those  of
1981.  This dynamic  interaction reinforced  the weakness  of  export markets,  com-
modities  prices,  and land values.
In  short,  financial  factors,  together with erroneous  expectations  of  land
values and inflation, were  fundamental  to  the motivation for farm expansion and-9-
debt acquisition.  These  factors  are  also  fundamental  to  an  understanding of  the
causes  of  the  "farm  crisis."  This  conclusion has been reinforced by a variety
of  recent  studies  (Boehlje,  1986;  Bain  and Paulson,  1986).  In  the  main,  this
crisis  appears  to  result  from  financial  forces arising  largely  from outside  of
agriculture - primarily monetary and  fiscal  policy and exchange  rate adjust-
ments.  The  financial  picture  of  the  farm sector which  emerges  is  striking, both
in  terms  of  the magnitude of what  is  owed by  farmers  and  the  rapid deterioration
of debt  repayment  capacity  in  the  face  of weak demand and  falling  commodities
prices.
A survey of  farm  financial  conditions  revealed that  in  January  1984,
16.6  percent  of all  farm operators  were  experiencing some  sort  of  financial
stress,  indicated  by debt/asset ratios  in  excess  of 40  percent.  A year  later,
the  proportion of  farm operators  under  financial stress  had  more than doubled.
In  January  1985,  farm operators with debt/asset  ratios greater  than 40  percent
held nearly  two-thirds  of a  total  farm debt  of approximately $212  billion, while
an estimated 34.4 percent  of  this  total was  held  by  farm operators  who  faced
extreme  financial  stress, with debt/asset ratios  greater  than  70  percent
(Barickman,  1985,  p.  16).  By January,  1986, a nine  state  survey in  the  upper
Midwest  indicated  that  52  percent were  in the  financial  stress  category  (see
Bain  and  Paulson, 1986,  p. 8).  The  overall balance  sheet  of  the  farm sector  is
shown  in  Table  1.  A  separate  survey documented  that  this debt  is  heavily  skewed
to  younger  farm operators, who are generally better  educated and  more inclined
to  adopt new  techniques  of  production (see Table  2).  A  final observation  is
that  this  debt  is  disproportionately borne  by  large  farms  (see below).  In  part,
this  is because  these  farms  became  large by assuming debt;  in  part,  it  is
because  large  farms  must  finance higher  investments  in  equipment and  other
expenses.-10-
The  general implication of  this  analysis is  that  financial  factors may  have
dominated technological  factors  in  the  1970s  and early  1980s  as  the  cause of
large  numbers  of farm quits.  Financial  factors  were  the dominant  reason  for
both farm expansion, including increases up  to  1970,  and  subsequent  farm
failure, especially after  1981.  If  this hypothesis  is  accurate,  then whether or
not  farm operators are technologically efficient  (or  large),  many will  quit  due
to  financial inability to maintain positive  net  returns.  If  technological and
financial inefficiency are positively related,  those who fail to  manage  their
operations well in one area may  also fail  to do  so  in  the other.  More
disturbing, however,  is  the possibility that  those who are now most  financially
stressed represent  some of  the most technologically efficient producers in  the
sector.  To  date, no systematic attempts have been made  to distinguish these
possibilities or to determine their relative validity.  Some  insight, however,
can be gained  from careful evaluation of  farm management  records,  to which we
now turn.-11-
FARM MANAGEMENT
Data from  the Minnesota farm management  associations  provide a picture of
the  relative impact  of current financial  conditions on different  sizes  and  cate-
gories of farms  (Eidman, 1985).  In  August,  1984,  survey data indicated  that  the
percentage  of operators  with higher  debt/asset ratios actually increased with
size of  farm.  Thirty-one percent of  farms with annual  sales of  $40,000  to
$199,999  and 56 percent of  operations with sales  over $200,000  reported debt/-
asset ratios  that  exceeded 40 percent.  These  ratios  were highest  in  the  export-
dependent cash grain sector, concentrated  in  Southeastern and  Southwestern
Minnesota, where  the average debt/asset ratios  were 49 and  47  percent  respec-
tively.
Simulations of some  representative farms in  Southwestern Minnesota were
conducted by Eidman based on mid-1985  projections of  the world  and U.S. economy.
These simulations were designed  to measure the impact of  the  complex forces
discussed above on both a large  (775  acre) crop  farm and  a medium (400 acre)
crop-hog farm typical  of  the grains  sector of the Upper Midwest.  Crop yields  on
these representative  farms  reflect  the application of  enhanced  technology.
Yields  on them have grown at  rates  18  to 20  percent above  the  county average  in
the  Southwestern Farm Management District.  Swine production  is  near the  asso-
ciation average.
Utilizing the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI)  model
and projections from Wharton Econometrics  in  May and June, 1985,  the performance
of  these  farms  was simulated over  the period  1985-89.  This simulation was
designed  to capture  the  impact of monetary, fiscal and  trade policy conditions
as  of  late  1985.  The assumptions used were:-12-
1.  Continued federal deficit spending  in the  range of  $200  billion.
2.  Real GNP growth of  2.6  - 3.5 percent annually.
3.  Unemployment decreases  from  7.4  to  6.7  percent.
4.  GNP deflator increases  from  3.7  to 4.9 percent.
5.  Three month Treasury-bill rates averaging  from 6.9  to  8.4  percent.
6.  Modest declines in the value of  the dollar, equal  to  16  percent  from
1986-89, with most of  the decline  coming during 1986-77,
7.  Average  annual gross  domestic product  (GDP) growth of  3.6 percent  in Latin
America, 6.0 percent  in the Pacific Basin, 2.2  percent in  Europe,  and 3.3
percent  in  the Centrally Planned Economies.
These assumptions were  combined with farm support prices  (deficiency
payments and loan rates)  set equal  to  those of  1984-85  (see Appendices  1 and 2).
This assumption is  likely to  slightly overstate farm income  in light of  the  1985
farm bill, which will lead to downward  adjustments  in  loan rates.  In addition,
it  was  assumed  that farmers  could exercise  the option to  repay loans at  the
lower  of  the  two values  represented by  the loan rate or  the market price.  The
costs of  the new farm bill are unlikely  to allow the  Secretary of Agriculture
this  discretion, again leading  to slight overstatement of  farm incomes  in  the
simulations.
Two simulations were conducted.  One was based  on average management levels
in comparison to  the Farm Management Association as  a whole.  The other was
based on a high level of management, equivalent  to  that of  the most efficient
producers in the  association.  These management  levels,  together with  the  yield
assumptions  cited above,  provide a proxy for  technological efficiency and  its
relative  impact on farm profitability compared to  financial  factors.  It  should
be emphasized that  farmers  participating in  the surveys  are generally an above-13-
average sample,  so that  the simulations  tend  to  grant  the benefit  of  the  doubt
to  the  representative  farms  in terms  of  production efficiency.  In order  to  test
the impact  of  initial debt/asset position on farm survival a .30 ratio was com-
pared  to a .70 ratio.  This  comparison allows  the  relative effect  of  financial
stress  to  be guaged.
Net  farm income,  adjustments  in  the value of  farm equity  (assets),  and  the
probability of survival  in each management  category are  shown in  tables 3, 4,
and 5.  With average  levels of management, net  farm income  (tables 3 and  4)
improves over  the  1986-89  period  for both sizes of farms with a beginning
debt/asset ratio of  .30.  However,  the  same farms  experience negative  net  farm
income with a beginning debt/asset ratio of  .70, which persists  over most of  the
period.  The large  crop farm shows  a more sustained negative net  loss  than  the
combined operation.
With high management  levels,  a debt/asset  ratio of  .30 leads to  increased
net  farm income over  the period, moving from $31,668  to a healthy $51,430  for
the  crop  farm and  $20,283  to  $27,702  for  the crop-hog operation.  With
debt/asset ratios  of  .70, however, this  improvement  is substantially reduced on
both operations.  In  either case,  net farm incomes with an initial debt/asset
position of .70 are likely  to be  very marginal, and  will probably induce  large
numbers of  quits.
When combined with the somewhat  optimistic assumptions  of  farm price  sup-
ports  underlying the simulations,  the conclusion that emerges  is  that  the  ini-
tial debt/asset position of  the  farm is  a better indicator of  the likelihood of
who will quit  than relative technological  and managerial  efficiency.  The  signi-
ficance  of  financial relative  to technological  factors  is  thus  given support.-14-
In  table 5, specific estimates  for  the probability of  survival of  the  two
representative farms  are presented.  These estimates  are based on  beginning
equity values, estimated decreases in equity due  to  land price declines,  and  the
resulting probability that the  farm will have  debt/asset ratios  in  excess  of  1.0
or  .8 at  the end of  1989.  A debt/asset  ratio of  1.0  is generally unsurvivable;
a value of  .8  places  the survival of  the operation  in  considerable jeopardy.  As
the  table indicates, with average management  the large  crop farm and  the smaller
crop-hog farm are both relatively certain to survive  if  initial debt/asset
ratios are  .30.  If the  initial debt/asset  position is  .70, however, the  proba-
bility that  the  large crop farm will survive is  reduced  considerably, with only
an 80 percent probability of  an ending debt/asset ratio  less  than one,  and no
probability of  a debt/asset less  than  .80.  The crop-hog  farm is  placed in  even
greater danger by an initial debt/asset ratio of  .70, with only a 55  percent
probability of  an ending debt/asset  ratio less  than one  and no  probability  of  an
ending position less than  .80.
Shifts  from average to high management  do not  affect  the  survival capacity
of  either farm in  the initial  .30 debt/asset  position.  Both  farms  remain  rela-
tively  secure as  before.  High management somewhat  improves  the probability of
survival at  an initial debt/asset ratio of  .70.  This  improvement is  not
striking, however, again suggesting the  relative importance of  financial factors
for  farm survival.  The large  crop farm continues  to  show only an  80 percent
chance of  an ending debt/asset ratio less  than one,  and  its chances  of an  ending
ratio  less than  .80  are now only 25  percent.  The  crop-hog farm  shows a certain
ending debt/asset ratio  less than one,  but only a 25  percent chance  of  a ratio
less  than .80.-15-
These  results are driven largely by projected changes  in  the value of  land
(Eidman,  1985).  Regardless of  technological  efficiency, and despite optimistic
assumptions about support prices,  the financial impacts  of  land price devalu-
ations  on farm finances continue  to dominate  the survival capacity of  farms  in
both large and medium size  categories.-16-
SOME  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
While  the  data  presented above are  in  no way  conclusive,  they provide  some
insight  into  the  impact  of agricultural  and  general  economic  policy on  the
future  structure  of American agriculture.  Three main implications  emerge  from
the analysis.
First,  if  it  is  true  that monetary, fiscal  and  exchange  rate  policies  have
been the  main cause of  farm bankruptcies,  then  the  1985  Farm Bill,  acting alone,
can do  little  to  alleviate  the stresses  being  felt  in  the agricultural  sector.
Instead,  three financial  factors  emerge as  of paramount  importance  to  farm  re-
covery.  First, without substantial  reductions  in  real  interest  rates,  either
via  reduced borrowing costs,  increased  inflation, or  both, financial  pressures
will continue.  Second,  land  value declines will  place  those with high
debt/asset  ratios  in  an  increasingly  tenuous  position, encouraging  the  most
highly  leveraged producers  to  quit  farming, at  least  in  the  short  run.  Because
these  farmers  are  disproportionately made  up of  large  producers, downward
pressure on  farm size  can  be  expected  to  persist  for a  time.  Third,  exports
will  continue  to  dominate  the demand  for agricultural  commodities, especially  in
the  grains  sector.  Weak demand  for  U.S.  agricultural  exports  will  in  turn
contribute to  increases  in  surplus  stocks,  reducing world market prices  and
raising  ths  costs  of  U.S.  farm price  support  programs.  These  program costs will
continue  to  fuel  a  federal budget deficit  that  puts  direct upward  pressure  on
interest  rates  and  indirect  upward  pressure on exchange  rates,  exacerbating the
financial difficulties  identified above.  If  past  trends  in  farm land  purchases
are  any  guide,  those  farms  with  lower  leverage positions  will purchase  farm land
and  equipment  from neighbors.  However,  in  the  absence of renewed  strength in-17-
commodities  prices,  the  financial  rewards  to  farm expansion are  likely  to  con-
tinue  to  be  small.  If,  given relative  costs  of labor  and mechanical  inputs,
there  are  no  clear technological  economies  to  larger  farm size,  there  seems
little  reason  to  suppose  that  farms  will  grow as  rapidly as  in  the  1970s.
Instead,  land  will be  retired  from production, notably  through government
acreage and  conservation set-aside  programs.
A  second  implication concerns  tha  impact  of current  trends  on  the  age
distribution of  farm operators.  The  data  reported above  indicate  that many  of
the  farmers  that  took on  debt  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  were younger and  generally
better educated.  The  burden of  downward  price adjustements  in  land  values  fell
with  particular  force  on  this  group.  Many  of  these  farmers were  the  products  of
the  land-grant  colleges,  educated  in  the ways  of expansive,  technologically
sophisticated, export-oriented agriculture.  If  large  numbers  now quit  the  sec-
tor,  it  will  constitute a  substantial  loss  of human capital  and  technological
expertise,  possibly leading  to  a "missing generation"  in American  farming.
Although many economists  have  argued  that  excess  capacity  in  the  farm  sector
requires  large  numbers  of quits  to  restore equilibrium,  the  question of who will
quit has  not  been squarely addressed.  The  result  can be  to  lower  the  produc-
tivity of  the  sector  as  a whole.  If  the  quitters  are  drawn disproportionately
from a group  of  highly eucated  and  technologically  sophisticated producers  who
are  also heavily  in  debt,  the  social  costs  in  terms  of  foregone returns  to
investment  in  agricultural  research and education may be  substantial.  This
argument  is  reinforced  by  the  generally high rates  of return resulting  from
these  investments  (Ruttan, 1982).
A  final  implication  for  policy  concerns  the  future  competitiveness  of
American  farmers.  If  the  burden  of adjusting  to  new  financial  conditions  in-18-
agriculture  falls  on those most heavily  indebted,  and  these  producers are
disproportionately made up  of  young, well-educated and  technologically advanced
producers, the effect may be  to  erode  the  competitive advantage represented by
the  level and  quality of human capital in American agriculture.  This human
capital resource  is  as  important  as  our soils,  water, climate, and  infrastruc-
ture in guaranteeing long-term competitiveness in world markets.  The  foregone
benefits of  this  loss  of competitiveness  are extremely difficult  to  estimate,
and  the  costs of  preventing these producers from bankruptcy may not  justify
them.  These  issues are  beyond  the scope of  this  paper, which has  attempted to
diagnose the nature of  structural changes  in agriculture, rather  than provide
specific prescriptions.-19-
CONCLUSION
The  causes  of  the farm financial  crisis are  complex, involving  trends
largely outside  the reach  of  traditional agricultural policy instruments.  This
paper has  provided an argument for  the  importance of  financial  factors  in  the
current farm crisis.  Interest rates,  input costs, and  expectations of  land
values and inflation dominate technological change as  an explanation  for  farm
size and  farm quits.  These  financial  factors may also  help  to explain  the  lack
of  strong  incentives to  increase farm acreage  in  the near future.  The  impact of
these  factors requires  a new orientation for  agricultural policy, focused  less
on agricultural programs  then on fiscal, monetary and  trade policy.  Like  other
export-dependent,  interest  rate-sensitive sectors of  the economy, American agri-
culture  is  in danger of  losing its  international competitiveness.  The burden of
current  policies appears  to  fall disproportionately  on younger, more well-
educated producers,  leading to  reduced returns  to  previous investments  in  human
capital  in agriculture.
Unfortunately,  comparatively little attention has  been given by agri-
cultural policy analysts  to  the question of whether  those who quit  farming will
leave  behind  the group of  farmers most  capable of advancing  the overall  com-
petitiveness of  the agricultural sector.  If  current  trends are  allowed  to  con-
tinue,  financial adjustments may erode American agriculture's  advantage, which
rests  in large part on its  human capital base.-20-
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Table  1.  Balance sheet  of  the  farming sector  as  of  January  1, 1977,  1981,  1984-
1986.
% Change  % Change
from  from
1977  1981  1984  1985- / 1984-85  1986-  1985-86
Assets
Real estate  496.4  828.4  764.5  749.2  - 2.0  738.0  -1.5
Nonreal estate  134.2  228.6  216.5  221.1  +  2.0  224.4  +1.5
Financial assets  33.7  42.8  50.1  52.1  +  3.9  54.4  +4.4
Total assets  664.1  1089.8  1031.1  1022.4  - .8  1016.8  - .5
Claims
Liabilities
Real estate  55.2  95.5  111.6  110.9  - .6  110.0  - .8
Nonreal  estate  48.7  86.5  103.0  101.3  - 1.6  101.8  +  .5
Total  liabilities  103.9  182  214.7  212.1  - 1.2  211.8  - .2
Owner equity  560.2  907.8  816.4  810.7  - .7  805.0  - .7
Total  claims  664.1  1089.8  1031.1  1022.4  - .8  1016.8  - .5
Debt  to  asset  ratio  15.6  16.7  20.8  20.7  - .5  20.8  .4
a/ - preliminary
- forecast
Source:  United States Department of Agriculture,
Agricultural Finance Outlook and Situation, December  1984,  cited  in
Barickman,  1985,  p. 16.-24-
Table  2.  Debt/asset  ratios  of  farmers, by  age  and region of  the  country
The  average farmer under  35  years in  the  Central  United States  owes  $63  for
every  $100 of  land and equipment owned.
Under
35  35-44  45-54  55-64  65+
Central  63%  61%  46%  24%  10%
South  42  45  35  24  6
West  44  43  26  20  15
East  54  27  18  12  9
Source:  Joint  study by Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute
and the Farm Journal, March,  1985.-25-
Table  3.  Projected  net  farm income  for  the  large  crop  farm.
(in $1,000)
Beginning
Debt/asset  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Average Management
.30  16,341  18,995  26,189  25,250  32,536
.70  -17,532  -24,904  -14,456  -3,406  -4,098
High Management
.30  31,668  33,981  43,057  42,599  51,430
.70  5,483  7,517  15,484  13,306  19,188
Source:  Eidman, Vernon, "Description of Minnesota Agriculture,"
briefing before  the Minnesota  Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Natural Resources,  November 21,  1985;
prepared by  the Department of  Agricultural and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota.-26-
Table 4.  Projected net  farm income for  the medium crop-hog  farm.
(in $1,000)
Beginning
Debt/asset  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Average Management
.30  10,679  17,223  23,510  24,486  17,025
.70  -3,798  2,551  7,933  7,617  -347
High Management
.30  20,283  26,261  33,299  34,505  27,702
.70  5,274  11,731  18,695  19,661  12,580
Source:  Eidman, Vernon, "Description of Minnesota Agriculture,"
briefing before  the Minnesota Senate  Committee on
Agriculture and Natural Resources, November  21,  1985;
prepared by the Department of Agricultual and Applied
Economics, University of Minnesota.-27-
Table  5.  Equity adjustments  and probability of  survival over  the  1985-89 period.
Average Management  High Management
Beginning  Beginning  Prob.  Prob.  Prob.  Prob.
Debt/asset  Equity  Equity  of  of  Equity  of  of
1/1/85  1/1/85  12/31/89  D/A <  1  D/A <  .8  12/31/89  D/A < 1  D/A < .8
$  $  %  %  $  x  %
Large  Crop Farm
.30  499,106  413,550  100  100  483,710  100  100
.70  213,852  40,856  80  0  75,015  80  25
Medium Crop-Hog Farm
.30  274,363  235,634  100  100  283,267  100  100
.70  116,737  4,477  55  0  51,217  100  25
Source:  Eidman, Vernon, "Description of Minnesota Agriculture," briefing
before  the Minnesota Senate Committee on Agriculture and Natural
Resources, November 21,  1985;  prepared by the  Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.-28-
Appendix  1
VARIABLE LOAN  RATE  POLICY  PROPOSAL
Assumes:  A.  Target  prices and  loan rates are set  at  minimum 1984/85
levels,  and
B.  Farmers  have the  option of  repaying loans  at  the  loan rate
or  at  a market price,  whichever is  lower.
Values  for Selected Parameters
1985/86  988/8  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90
Loan Rate - Corn  2.55  2.55  2.55  2.55  2.55
Target  Rate - Corn  3.03  3.03  3.03  3.03  3.03
Set Aside - Corn  10%  20%  20%  20%  20%
Loan Rate - Soybeans  5.02  5.02  5.02  5.02  5.02
Farm Price - S.W. MN
Corn ($/bu)  2.35  1.91  2.10  2.32  2.34
Soybeans  ($/bu)  4.99  4.83  5.22  5.97  6.03
Hogs  ($/cwt)  45.00  43.00  45.00  47.00  45.00-29-
Appendix  2
Description of Southwestern Minnesota Farm
Medium Size
Large  Crop-Hog
Crop FaFarm  Farm
Cropland Owned  (acres)  500  200
Cropland Leased  (acres)  275  160
Breeding Herd  (no.  of  sows)  --  48
Market Value of Assets  1/1/85
Land  $531,160  $217,980
Other Real Estate  70,634  80,000
Farm Machinery  109,338  79,585
Livestock for Breeding  --  9,822
Total  $711,130  $387,387
Labor  Supply
Family Labor  (full-time equivalents)  1.5  1.0
Hired Labor  (full-time equivalents)  .25  .03
Average Management  Levels
Corn Yield  (bu/acre)  106.5  106.5
Soybeans Yield (bu/acre)  35.2  35.2
Slaughter Hogs  (direct cost/sow)  --  $722
(bu.  corn/sow)  - 180.3
High Management Level
Corn Yield  (bu/acre)  117.2  117.2
Soybean Yield  (bu/acre)  38.7  38.7
Slaughter Hogs  (direct cost/sow)  --  $686
(bu.  corn/sow)  - 171.3